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Introduction 
 
There is widespread concern that the United States and the rest of the world are descending into a 
round of protectionism and a trade war reminiscent of what the world experienced in the Great 
Depression. Such concerns are both overblown and misplaced. In the short term, the main concern 
in the United States and rest of the world should be to promote an increase in demand through 
whatever means necessary. For the longer term, there has been an excessive fixation on protection 
for merchandise trade. Other areas, most notably alternative intellectual property regimes and freer 
trade in highly paid professional services, offer much larger potential gains than further reductions in 
barriers to trade in goods. 
 
 
The Short Term Picture   
 
Last February, the United States Congress passed a $787 billion stimulus package designed to help 
boost the economy out of recession. This package contained a “Buy American” provision that 
applied to steel and some other manufactured goods that might be purchased as part of this stimulus 
package. This Buy American provision raised concerns about a new wave of protectionism around 
the world. In fact, judging by the reaction of some in the media, we are already in the midst of a full-
fledged trade war as a result of this provision of the stimulus bill. However, it is easy to show that 
the reaction to this Buy American provision was hugely disproportionate to its economic impact. 
Realistically, U.S. trading partners should have been very happy to have the stimulus package, even 
with its Buy American provision.  
 
The size of the stimulus package was $787 billion, the bulk of which involves tax cuts or spending 
that will take place in 2009 and 2010. If, for simplicity, we assign a multiplier of 1 to this package 
(the spending would mostly come with a higher multiplier, while the tax cuts a somewhat lower 
multiplier), then it will increase GDP by $787 billion over the period in which the stimulus is in 
place. If we assume a marginal propensity to import in the United States of 0.2, then an increase in 
GDP of $787 billion implies an increase in imports of just under $160 billion. 
 
The Buy American provision applied to a relatively small portion of the stimulus package. The 
largest components were tax cuts and aid to state and local governments so that they would not have 
to make budget cutbacks in response to a loss of tax revenues. The infrastructure portion of the 
program – together with the other items covered by the Buy American provision – accounts for less 
than $80 billion of the stimulus. 
 
However, even this figure hugely overstates the impact of the provision. Much of the spending in 
these categories is for labor. Certainly this is true in the case of infrastructure spending. And much 
of the materials used for infrastructure are items like asphalt and concrete, which have high weight 
per unit of value, and therefore are unlikely to have been imported even without the Buy American 
provision. The amount of goods that could plausibly be excluded as a result of this provision is 
probably in the neighborhood of 10 percent of the categories of the stimulus subject to the 
provision. In other words, the Buy American provision may exclude somewhere around $7-$8 
billion of imports, as shown in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1 
Imports from the Stimulus and the Impact of the Buy American Provision 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Increase in Imports Due to
Stimulus*
Portion of Stimulus Subject to
Buy American Provision 
Actual Items Subject to
Protection 
$
 b
il
li
o
n
s
 
Source: Author's calculations. *Marginal propensity to import = 0.2. 
 
 
It is understandable that U.S. trading partners would still be unhappy losing even this relatively 
limited market. However, it is important to recognize that this exclusion only came about because 
the United States passed a $787 billion stimulus package. President Obama had a serious fight in 
Congress over the passage of the stimulus and was able to get the package through with very few 
votes to spare. If he did not include the Buy American provision, it is likely that the stimulus bill 
would not have passed. 
 
Would U.S. trading partners be happier if the stimulus bill had not gone through at all? In that 
scenario, they would have a considerably smaller export market to the United States, but there would 
be no protectionist measures to raise concerns. It is difficult to imagine that U.S. trading partners 
would view this as a more desirable outcome. If a stimulus package without a Buy American 
provision was not politically feasible, then from the standpoint of U.S. trading partners, a stimulus 
package with the provision is almost certainly the second best outcome (although it is understandable 
that they would complain about it). 
 
This raises the larger question of what the short-term prospects are for U.S. trade. It is worth 
focusing on the simple accounting identity, that net foreign savings (X-M) is equal to the sum of 
public and private savings. The basic point is that if a country has a trade deficit, then the sum of 
public and private savings must be negative. 
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Before the recession began at the end of 2007, the United States had a trade deficit that was close to 
6 percent of GDP. The accounting identity implies that this must correspond to either a very large 
budget deficit (low public saving) or very low private savings. (There could also be an investment 
boom, which would mean in effect that foreign capital flows are financing a domestic investment 
boom, but that does not seem a plausible scenario for the near-term future.) At present, the trade 
deficit is at more moderate levels, but this is primarily the result of imports falling off during the 
downturn. When the U.S. economy starts to recover, it is likely that the trade deficit will again 
expand to a size that is close to its pre-recession level.  
 
If the trade deficit is taken as given, it raises a question as to what policy U.S. trading partners would 
like to see the government pursue to complete the accounting identity. On the one hand, the United 
States could run very large budget deficits, as it is projected to do in 2010. This can sustain demand 
in the U.S. economy, pushing up the U.S. trade deficit by raising imports, but it will also increase the 
U.S. government’s debt burden. Of course, several major trading partners of the United States have 
expressed unhappiness with the projected growth in the U.S. debt, supposedly out of concern for 
the future value of their dollar holdings. 
 
Suppose that the government does not directly boost demand with deficit spending. The alternative 
would be to have very low levels of private savings. This would bring us back to the situation that 
the United States had prior to the bursting of the housing bubble in the years 2005-2006. In those 
years, the government deficit was relatively modest; however, private saving was very low, with 
household saving being negative by some measures. This was the result of the consumption boom 
spurred by the housing bubble.  
 
So, we can get back to a situation of high trade deficits without large budget deficits if we can get 
another round of bubble-driven consumption. Would the U.S. trading partners consider this a good 
path? Would they be willing to make the loans to support the new asset bubble that would sustain 
another burst of consumption? 
 
Presumably the answer to these questions is “no.”  It is difficult to believe that anyone would want 
to see the United States economy again driven by an asset bubble. However, in the absence of a 
large federal budget deficit or an asset-bubble-driven consumption boom, there is no way that the 
U.S. economy can get back to normal levels of output with the current trade imbalance.  
 
There really is just one way out of this story and that is with a lower-valued dollar bringing about a 
decline in the trade deficit. An over-valued dollar has been at the heart of the imbalances in the U.S. 
economy and the world economy over the last decade. Unless the dollar drops to a level consistent 
with more balanced trade, the U.S. and world economies will continue to be subject to large 
imbalances. It is pointless to complain about large U.S. budget deficits and/or low households 
savings rates: these are the symptoms of this imbalance. Those who do not want to see the dollar 
decline in value are in effect endorsing the perpetuation of these symptoms of this imbalance, 
regardless of whether or not they understand this fact. 
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The Longer Term Trade Picture 
 
Most public debate on trade policy centers on tariffs and quotas on merchandise trade, the 
traditional topics of trade negotiations. However, as the world develops into an economy that is 
increasingly service-oriented, the potential impact of trade restrictions on merchandise trade will be 
less consequential through time. There are other areas of the economy where trade restrictions can 
potentially impose much greater damage. 
 
Intellectual Property 
At the top of this list is intellectual property restrictions, such as patent and copyright protection. 
The potential cost of these restrictions is clearest in the case of prescription drugs in the United 
States. The U.S. has by far the strongest protection for drug patents of any country in the world, 
allowing firms to enjoy their patent monopoly with no offsetting effort by the government to 
regulate prices for any substantial segment of the market. 
 
In 2009, the United States is projected to spend almost $250 billion, approximately 1.8 percent of 
GDP, on prescription drugs. It would likely spend about one-tenth this amount – $25 billion a year 
– if all drugs were sold as generics, without patent protection (see Figure 2). Spending on drugs in 
the United States is rising rapidly; it is projected to be close to $450 billion a year by the end of the 
next decade. The vast majority of this increase will be associated with higher mark-ups over 
production costs, not increased sales of prescription drugs. 
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FIGURE 2 
The Cost of Patent Protection for Prescription Drugs, 2009 
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Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Association of Chain Drug Stores, and author’s 
calculations 
 
The huge mark-ups on prescription drugs lead to a wide variety of economic distortions. The most 
obvious is simply the deadweight loss associated with a product that can sell for several hundred 
times its marginal cost. Many patients who can’t afford drugs at their patent-protected price would 
have no difficulty paying for the drugs if they were sold as generics. However, since most people in 
the United States do have insurance that will cover most of the cost of prescription drugs, the bigger 
waste is probably attributable to the efforts of insurers to limit their spending on drugs. Insurers put 
considerable effort into restricting their beneficiaries’ use of prescription drugs, for example by 
imposing strict quantity limits or by refusing to pay for drugs prescribed for certain conditions. The 
latter restriction sometimes creates a round of game playing in which doctors prescribe a drug for a 
condition that the patient may not have, in order to get around the restriction.  
 
This is just the beginning of the distortions created by patent-protected drug prices. As a result of 
the substantial mark-up on prescriptions, drug companies have enormous incentive to market their 
products aggressively. This marketing effort takes a variety of forms in the United States. The 
industry focuses extensively on promoting their drugs to doctors, since they usually make the 
decision as to which drug to prescribe to patients. The industry hires tens of thousands of 
“detailers” who go from doctor’s office to doctor’s office promoting their company’s drugs. The 
New York Times recently reported that the industry has begun hiring former cheerleaders to do 
these sales pitches to doctors, apparently since they can effectively convey information about the 
merits of various drugs. 
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In addition to pitches to doctors, drug companies in the United States have increasingly focused on 
direct advertising to consumers through television commercial or other media. These ads often take 
the form of a former athlete or movie star commenting on how a drug has been very helpful for 
them. Such ads may be a successful way to boost drug sales, but it is unlikely that they are conveying 
much information about the drug in question. 
 
Perhaps the biggest economic distortion associated with the extraordinary rents from patent 
protection for prescription drugs is the misinformation about the effectiveness of the drugs in 
question. Drug companies have control over the testing process for their drugs. They are required to 
turn over information about their test results to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order 
to prove that the drug is safe and effective and therefore can be sold on the market. However, the 
FDA is strictly prohibited from sharing this information with the public. 
 
This means that information that may be useful to doctors in determining which demographic 
groups may stand to most benefit from a drug, or be harmed by its side effects, will not generally be 
available. Of course, drug companies may not share all relevant information with the FDA. There 
have been many instances in which drug companies withheld test results that reflected poorly on 
their drugs, either concealing evidence that the drug was ineffective or in some cases that it could 
even be harmful. 
 
This discussion may appear to be a digression from a discussion of trade policy, however for the last 
two decades U.S. trade policy has made strengthening rules on patent and copyright protection in 
our trading partners a major priority. The United States insisted on including the TRIPS rules in the 
last WTO round and has made intellectual property issues a central concern in almost every bilateral 
trade agreement it has negotiated.  
 
This drive to increase intellectual property protection is certainly a top priority of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the entertainment and software industry. Certainly the goal of the 
pharmaceutical industry, if not necessarily of U.S. trade negotiators, is to have consumers in other 
countries pay the same prices for prescription drugs as people in the United States. They would very 
much like a scenario is which other countries have the same sort of gap between the price and cost 
for pharmaceuticals that is only seen now in the United States. (Intellectual property does provide an 
important incentive for innovation, but there are almost certainly more efficient mechanisms that 
could be developed, especially in the case of prescription drugs.1)  
 
In this context, the potential harm to consumers and to economic growth from strengthened 
intellectual property rules is likely to dwarf the barriers on merchandise trade flows that are now 
featured prominently in discussions of trade conflict. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry in 
the United States, the excess cost of prescription drugs attributable to patent protection is likely to 
exceed 2 percent of GDP before the end of the next decade. There is no plausible set of tariffs and 
quotas that could be imposed by the United States on merchandise trade that would impose any 
remotely comparable burden on its trading partners. In short, U.S. trading partners stand to lose 
                                                 
1
  See Baker, Dean, “The Benefits and Savings of Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs,” CEPR Briefing 
Paper, March 2008 (http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/clinicaltrials_2008_03.pdf) and Baker, Dean, 
“Stagnation in the Drug Development Process: Are Patents the Problem?” CEPR Briefing Paper, March 2007 
(http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/healthcare_stagnation_2007_03.pdf). 
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much more from accepting conditions on intellectual property as part of trade agreements than they 
do from increased protectionist barriers on merchandise trade. 
 
  
Professional Barriers 
The other major area in which barriers impose often-overlooked economic costs is in trade in 
professional services, specifically the highly-paid services of doctors, lawyers, and other highly-
educated professionals. The United States has a wide variety of barriers that make it difficult for 
even highly-qualified professions from working in the United States.  
 
At the most basic level, there is limited opportunity for competing by price. Employers of foreign 
professionals in the United States must certify that they had attempted to hire a U.S. citizen at the 
prevailing wage, and had been unable to do so, before they can obtain a visa for a foreign 
professional for a specific position. In other words, a hospital, a university, or a law firm is legally 
prohibited from hiring dozens of qualified foreign professionals because they are prepared to work 
at a lower wage than their U.S. counterparts.  
 
The restrictions on hiring foreign professionals would be comparable to requiring that Wal-Mart 
first attempt to buy clothing or other merchandise in the United States. Only after failing to find the 
desired merchandize would Wal-Mart be allowed to import goods, and even then, it would have to 
pay a price comparable to what is charged by U.S. manufacturers. Of course, such a regime would 
be immediately (and appropriately) attacked as protectionist. However, the restrictions on 
professional services rarely get raised in public debates in trade. 
 
This should be disturbing to those who are concerned about the economic cost of protectionist 
barriers. The United States pays roughly twice as much for its doctors as the average for other 
wealthy countries. This costs the United States approximately $80 billion a year in extra payments. 
(Not all of this gap is due to higher pay for the same positions. A much greater share of physicians 
in the United States are specialists than in other wealthy countries. However, the over-use of 
specialists is a predictable outcome of rent seeking in the context of a protected industry.)  
 
By comparison, the peak cost of the tariffs that the United States is imposing on Chinese tires 
should be in the range of $3 billion a year (see Figure 3). The economic costs and the risks of a 
trade war from the tire tariffs has been a major topic of debate in the United States, though the costs 
imposed by barriers on trade in highly-paid professional services almost never get mentioned in 
public debates.      
 
The comparison in this figure is an over-simplification, but it is almost certainly the case the United 
States would stand to have substantial gains if it actively sought to reduce the barriers to the free 
flow of highly educated professionals across national borders. There would be corresponding 
potential gains for the sending countries. Professionals trained in these countries would stand to 
earn much higher wages during their working years, especially those from developing countries.  
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FIGURE 3 
The Cost of Protecting Doctors versus the Cost of Protecting Tires 
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Source: AMA and Tire Industry Association. 
 
 
In many cases, if the barriers were removed, professionals may opt to move back and forth over the 
course of their working career. However, in order to ensure that the sending countries as a whole 
benefited from this sort of migration, and not just the professionals, it would be a relatively simple 
matter to have a tax attached to the earning of foreign-trained professionals, which would be 
remitted back to their country of origin to compensate for the cost of their education and training. 
This would ensure that all parties gain from this particular form of trade. 
 
For whatever reason, obstacles to trade in highly-paid professional services rarely get mentioned in 
discussions of protectionism even though the economic losses may be one or even two orders of 
magnitude greater than the losses associated with most of the polices that do get singled out as 
protectionist. As goods production continues its long decline as a share of world output, the relative 
importance of protectionist measures in trade in services will almost certainly increase. In this case, 
as with the case of strengthened protection for intellectual property, it seems that concerns over 
protectionism have been seriously misplaced.   
